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Recent Developments in Tito's Purge

The breathing spell in resignations of Yugoslav leaders continues as regime leaders turn their attention toward filling some of the gaps created by the initial wave of the purge.

In Slovenia, a new candidate for premier of the republic has been nominated to replace the popular ex-Premier Stane Kavcic. Dr. Anrej Marinc, a 42 year old agricultural engineer, is now preparing to select a cabinet--under the republic constitution the old cabinet's tenure ended with premier Kavcic's resignation, but the individual members were asked to stay on until a new team was selected. Judging by some Slovene party assessments, Marinc faces a difficult situation in his new post. At the last central committee plenum, one speaker warned against a turn toward a witchhunt and "an escalation of primitivism. Such a turn in the highly modernized Slovene economy would threaten a wholesale replacement of numerous technocrats. It apparently will be Marinc's job to calm these fears while simultaneously giving support to Tito's demands for putting the technocrats into their rightful place--i.e., subservient to the party.

Two central committee plenums are scheduled this week in other areas. The Kosovo party plenum meets today and the Macedonians will convene Friday. Personnel changes are possible in either area, but not likely in view of the current effort to consolidate the situation. Unfortunately, the press no longer reports blow by blow descriptions of such meetings and it will be difficult to determine whether or not there are fissures in the two parties. In Macedonia, it is likely that the plenum will select a replacement to Krste Milosavlevski, who resigned in October as deputy to party boss Angel Cemerski and as a Macedonian representative on the LCY presidium.

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Zhivkov Delegation Returns from Moscow

Bulgarian party/state leader Todor Zhivkov returned on 18 November from a five-day official visit to Moscow. Details of the topics discussed are lacking, but from the reference to resolving economic "problems" in the final communique, and the presence of deputy Premier and CEMA representative Tano Tsolov in the entourage, it would appear that economic

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relations were the main topic under discussion. Zhivkov presented his Soviet mentors with the Order of Georgi Dimitrov and did everything but impale himself on the Kremlin spirals to express his devotion and loyalty to the Soviet Union. Zhivkov made one trip outside Moscow, to the Dimitrov aircraft plant at Tbilisi, Georgia.

By far the most intriguing paragraph in the final communique is the reference to the fact that the two sides reached an "agreement" on working out concrete measures for problems connected with a closer interaction between Bulgaria and the USSR in conformity with the tasks set by the comprehensive program for socialist economic integration." Bulgaria has been highly successful in obtaining economic assistance from Moscow in return for subservience in the realm of foreign affairs. This success has been so great that some Soviets view the Bulgars as bleeding them dry. The Soviets may have found themselves in the unusual position of having to apply the brakes on closer ties to an Eastern European comrade. The rest of the communique contains the standard rhetoric which is common place when the Bulgars and Soviets get together: The two pledged to work together against manifestations of nationalism, revisionism and opportunism in the international communist movement; praised the GDR-FRG treaty; lauded Moscow's initiative on CSCE; declared themselves in favor of strengthening peace and security in the Balkans; and "confirmed their identical position" on the need for calling a world conference on disarmament. 25X1

Hungarian Central Committee Session

Party first secretary Janos Kadar reviewed developments of the last two years and economic specialist Rezso Nyers presented the economic directives for 1973 at a two-day central committee meeting last week. A lengthy, belated communique explicitly affirmed Hungary's major internal and external policies, including the economic reform (NEM), flexible cultural policies, and the role of the party. There were no personnel changes.

Reviewing international developments, the communique termed relations with China and Albania "not satisfactory," and broadly hinted that Budapest wants to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn. Notably absent was any obeisance to Czech-FRG negotiations as a prerequisite for establishing such ties. The communique also approved of a conference on the "mutual reduction of military forces facing each other in Europe," plumped for the US signature of a Vietnam peace agreement, and made a low-key reference to Hungary's improved relations ("some advance") with the U.S. Proper respect was paid to Hungary's supreme ally (the USSR), the Warsaw Pact, and CEMA.

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
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On the domestic side, attention focused on economic matters. Aside from a few minor adjustments in some prices and wages, the only potentially substantive developments included the call for a new "state planning commission" and the promise of newly modified economic regulators to be introduced in 1975. The impact of the new state planning commission is yet to be seen, but the communique tasks it with wide-ranging authority to coordinate the planning work of the ministries, advise the government on the economic plan, regulate the economy and supervise its implementation. At the same time, the communique calls for an expansion of the authority of the national planning office, echoing Kadar's earlier statement. Separation of jurisdictional responsibilities may prove to be a neat trick.

Both the call for a state planning commission and the promise of newly modified economic regulators may well be the outgrowth of a study group that was set up in late 1971 to explore ways to improve the NEM. The study group reportedly was Kadar's answer to a purported conservative challenge over the NEM (and the poor economic performance in 1971); its recommendations, while not yet spelled out, appear at first blush to be nothing more than the usual tinkering with the NEM.

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